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THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR PRECEDENT
THOMAS W. MERRILL*

This Essay offers some reasons why conservatives should favor giving great weight to precedent in constitutional adjudication. Let me start with some preliminary observations about
the debate between originalism and precedent more generally.
First, the debate has been dominated to far too great an extent
by specific cases, Roe v. Wade1 in particular. It is distressing that
the only issue that has seemed to matter in recent confirmation
hearings is what a nominee thinks about Roe v. Wade. Similarly,
in the precedent versus originalism debate, much of the discussion-even in the law reviews-is animated by what commentators think about Roe v. Wade. So, if you think Roe v. Wade was an
illegitimate usurpation of power by the judiciary, and you want
to overrule it, it somehow follows that you think all constitutional law should be based on something other than precedent.
On the other hand, if you like Roe v. Wade, and you want to reaffirm it, somehow all precedent must be a good thing. This is an
extraordinarily myopic way of thinking about the problem.
Those who regard themselves as conservatives and embrace
some of the values that David Strauss mentions-the rule of law,
stability and predictability in the law, judicial restraint, the belief
that social policy decisions should be made by elected representatives of the people rather than by the judges 2- should not have
their views on precedent versus originalism driven by one case.
Second, we cannot resolve the debate by adopting the conceptual apparatus of one school or the other, and by pointing
out that the rival approach has no place within the conceptual
apparatus we adopt. To a large extent, originalism and precedent reside in parallel universes that do not intersect. The case
for originalism starts with legal positivism, the idea that only

* Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See David Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists,31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 969 (2008).
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enacted law is the law of the land. 3 Starting from this assumption, it follows that when there is an ambiguity in the law, we
should try to resolve it by determining the meaning of the lawgiver. Such an approach naturally leads to looking at original
sources for interpreting the law. As Steven Calabresi implicitly
frames the question, "Does originalism say that precedent can
trump the enacted law?" 4 The answer, of course, is "No, it does
not." If we start from originalist premises, we do not leave
much room for precedent or stare decisis.
Conversely, if one starts from the universe of precedent, that
universe is founded in the Holmesian observation that the law
is, ultimately, the judgments of the courts., If you adopt this
perspective, you say, "Well, what predicts the judgments of
courts is the precedents of courts, and therefore precedent is
law." So, if we want to know whether or not following precedent is permissible, we find the answer by looking to precedent.
And guess what we find? Judges say we ought to follow precedent. So precedent it is. This universe does not leave much
space for the Constitution and enacted law. Thus, we have two
parallel universes that operate on different planes: the universe
of enacted law, and the universe of judge-made law. One cannot reason from the premises of one to oust the other.
The reality is that every Justice, at least since the days of the
Marshall Court, has relied to some extent on both originalist
reasoning and precedent. Professor Calabresi is absolutely correct
that when moments of high drama and crisis arise, the Justices
tend to revert to the constitutional text and to the statements of
the Framers. 6 On the other hand, studies of the Justices have
indicated that approximately eighty percent or more of the authorities they cite in their constitutional opinions are precedents of the Supreme Court.7 The most careful study examined
the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, who were the
prototypical ideological outliers at the time the study was conducted.8 Presumably, centrist judges rely on precedent to an
3. See, e.g., Steven Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in ConstitutionalLaw, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 947, 948 (2008).
4. Id.
5. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.L. REV. 61, 61 (1897).
6. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 951-55.
7. See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence:Interpretive
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 567, 583, 594 (1991).
8. Id. at 594.
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even greater extent. Even Justices Scalia and Thomas routinely
rely on precedent. To some extent, then, precedent also has to
be considered in the equation.
A final preliminary point is that the ultimate question for
conservatives or people who value the rule of law is not so
much what theory a judge applies, but rather the attitude with
which the judge approaches the task of deciding cases. We
want our judges to apply the law in good faith, seeking the best
answer that the law provides, rather than attempting to advance their personal policy preferences by manipulating legal
authorities to reach certain predetermined ends. It is very hard
to legislate this attitude.
Lawyers are familiar with these competing approaches because clients sometimes ask lawyers to tell them what the law is
on some point, so the client can correct or guide her behavior
accordingly. When the lawyer gets such a request for fair and
impartial advice, he adopts one approach to analyzing legal authorities. On other occasions, the lawyer may be asked to defend
a position a client has already taken, as by filing a brief in court.
In this situation, the lawyer is in the position of being an advocate, and so adopts a very different mode of spinning legal authorities. Judges ideally should adopt the first or investigatory
mode in deciding cases, not the second or spinning mode. That
is, judges should seek to determine what the law is, not what it
should be. But it is very hard to prescribe this attitude by using
any particular technique of decision making.
Having said that, I think that technique does matter at the
margins; the key issue here in terms of precedent versus
originalism is whether the courts should adopt a strong theory
of precedent in constitutional law cases-as they already have
done in cases of statutory interpretation 9 - or whether they
should adopt a weak theory. Steven Calabresi and Akhil Amar
argue correctly that the Supreme Court is speaking with a
forked tongue when the Justices profess to have a strong theory
of precedent in constitutional law."0 At least since Casey they
have in fact employed a weak theory of precedent. For a number of reasons, a strong theory of precedent would be better.
Professor Strauss has given several excellent reasons. In the
9. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("Considerations of staredecisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation .... ").
10. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 951; Akhil Reed Amar, On Text and Precedent,
31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 961 (2008).
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remainder of this Essay I will offer four other points, designed
to appeal particularly to conservatives.
First, the legal norms that would apply in resolving disputed
questions of law are much thicker in the universe of precedent
than they are in the world of originalism. The Constitution itself is notoriously cryptic. It must be supplemented with some
other source of law. At this stage in our legal evolution, precedent provides more law to draw upon in supplementing the
language of the Constitution than do originalist sources.
Consider the question whether Congress could ban advertisements for pharmaceutical drugs in newspapers and magazines. The originalist answer would be extremely indeterminate, because there is virtually nothing in the original materials
that speaks to the matter. If we turn to Supreme Court case
law, there is still some room for argument, but the norms are
much thicker, and the likelihood that the answer is one on
which people could reach consensus is much greater.
Another point is accessibility. In order for law to have an impact on behavior, it must be accessible to legal actors other than
Supreme Court Justices. The precedents of the Supreme Court
are published in the United States Reports and similar volumes.
They are online; they have been indexed; they are easily searchable; every lawyer and judge in the country can readily get her
or his hands on them. The materials that bear on original understanding are vast, often inaccessible, and in some cases only now
being discovered. People frequently find new documents that
might bear on original understanding. As a result, it is much
harder for us to get our hands on those materials. It follows that
a world in which the Constitution was interpreted using
originalist sources rather than precedent would be one in which
the behavior of legal actors would be less constrained by law.
Third, as Professor Strauss suggested, the style of reasoning
from precedent is much more compatible with the skill set of the
typical American lawyer or judge than is reasoning from original
materials." This reason is contingent on the nature of the legal
system; if we had different judges or if we taught them differently in law schools, they might become more competent at reasoning from such materials. The reality, however, is that lawyers
and judges are much more comfortable dealing with precedent.
It follows that decisions reached by following precedent are
11. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 970-71.
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more likely to be comprehended and predicted than decisions
reached using original materials would be.
The last point is, again, a kind of contingent, pragmatic point
relating to the method by which judges and Justices are picked
in this country. Many lawyers and legal scholars would like to
see a process by which judges are selected because of their legal knowledge, legal skills, and judicial temperament, not because of their ideology or particular political beliefs. Which
style of constitutional reasoning over time is more likely to
push us to a system in which we pick judges based on their
competence and their legal abilities, and which is more likely to
produce tempestuous proceedings in which we pick people
based on ideological considerations?
Here, I think the key variable is the capacity of different legal
methods to produce change in the law. If the Court were to
commit to a strong theory of precedent in constitutional law, it
would reduce the prospects for change through constitutional
interpretation. A strong theory of precedent would lock in some
decisions that conservatives do not like. It would also lock in
some decisions that they do like. Nonetheless, its greatest impact
would be to make the Court a less attractive forum for achieving
social policy outcomes through litigation. Consequently, the interest groups that are trying to get their various positions advanced through the courts would decide that the courts are not
really the best hole in which to go fishing. They would decide
that maybe they should try to get some laws passed by legislatures or get their policy preferences adopted by amending the
Constitution.
A judiciary that stood firm with a strong theory of precedent
would rechannel our nation back toward democratic institutions
and away from using the courts to make social policy. This in
turn would put a premium on legal knowledge and skills,
rather than political preferences, in selecting future judges and
Justices. The prospect of such a reorientation is reason enough
to endorse the strong theory of precedent in constitutional law.

